CATCHING THE MAN BEHIND THE MAN: WHY THE
SEC AND FINRA SHOULD CAPITALIZE ON SECTION
20(b) TO PURSUE CONTROL PERSONS
CHRISTOPHER JOHN IPPOLITI*

“Qui facit per alium facit per se.” (He who acts through another, acts himself.)1
I. INTRODUCTION
This article sets forth a fully developed legislative history behind Section
20(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a detailed summary of cases
involving Section 20(b) claims, and analyzes the viewpoints of multiple
commentators to find answers to the following questions:
•
•
•
•
•

What does the legislative history reveal about the intent of the drafters of
Section 20(b)?
Why should the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey be
overruled entirely?2
Are Section 20(b) claims viable in light of the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders?3
What elements are necessary to prove Section 20(b) claims?
What kinds of Section 20(b) claims can we expect to see from the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)?

Section 20(b), which has been rarely used by FINRA or the SEC,
concerns the liability of controlling persons and unlawful activity that takes place
through other persons.4
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2

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974).

3

Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).

4

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(b) (2006).
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The following consists of a comprehensive timeline of the substantive
legislative history behind Section 20(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“’34 Act”); however, duplicative, and patently irrelevant references to the other
sub-sections in Section 20 have been omitted.
A. The Legislative History of the “Liability of Controlling Persons” Provision
Prior to delving into the legislative history, it is worth noting that Section
20(b) did not have a corresponding provision in the Securities Act of 1933 (“’33
Act”). One of the reports from the House of Representatives concerning Section
15 of the ’33 Act stated that the so-called “dummy provisions” were “calculated
to place liability upon a person who acted through another, irrespective of
whether a direct agency relationship existed but dependent upon the actual
control exercised by the one party over the other.”5 This later became the basis
for Section 20(a) in the ‘34 Act, which was modeled after Section 15 of the ‘33
Act, but Section 20(b) was a novel regulation.
As of January 23, 1934, the draft of the “Stock Exchange Bill” did not yet
contain a provision to address the liability of controlling persons, but this
changed shortly thereafter on February 1, 1934, when a handwritten note
contemplated, simply, “[l]iability of controlling persons” as a potential revision.6
However, on February 9, 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt submitted a
“Recommendation to Congress for Enactment of the Act” with a draft bill
containing the following provision:
LIABILITY OF CONTROLLING PERSONS
Section 19. (a). Every person who, by or through stock
ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who pursuant to or in
connection with any agreement or understanding with one or
more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, controls any person liable under any provision of this
Act or of any rule or regulation made pursuant thereto shall also
be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person
is liable.7
5

H.R. REP. NO. 73-152, at 27 (1933).

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (Pub. L. No. 291, 73d
Congress, 48 Stat 881, (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78).
6

S. 2693, 73d Cong. § 19 (2d Sess. 1934) reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 37-38 (2001).
7
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During this same time leading up to President Roosevelt’s
recommendations, a different committee member, whose identity is unknown,
drafted somewhat different language to address controlling persons, as follows:
LIABILITY OF CONTROLLING PERSONS
Sec. 22. Every person who, by or through stock ownership,
agency, or otherwise, or who pursuant to or in connection with
any agreement or understanding with one or more other persons
by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any
person liable under any provision of this act or of any regulation
promulgated pursuant thereto or of any rule required by such
regulation shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom
such controlled person is liable and to any penalties to which such
controlled person is liable, unless he shall sustain the burden of
proof that he acted in good faith without knowledge that such
controlled person was committing or was about to commit such
violation.8
Nevertheless, Section 19 was later expanded to include sub-sections,
including the earliest known version of Section 19(b):
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly to do
any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do
under the provisions of this Act or any rule or regulation
thereunder through or by means of any other person who is
controlled by such person by or through stock ownership, agency,
or otherwise or through or by means of any other person who is
controlled by such person and one or store other persons by or
through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise for the purpose of
avoiding any provisions of this Act or any rule or regulation made
thereunder.9
On February 9, 1934, Senator Duncan Fletcher issued remarks on the
introduction of S. 2693, as follows:
Section 19 provides that persons who control others subject to
the provisions of the act and regulations thereunder shall likewise
be subject themselves. Not only does it cover the usual devices,
8

See supra, note 7.

9

See supra, note 8.
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such as dummy corporations, but provides that when a member
of the immediate family of a person forbidden to make a given
transaction in a security effects such a transaction, the person
forbidden shall have the burden of showing that the transaction
was not an attempted evasion of the act.10
In a letter dated February 14, 1934, Richard Whitney, the President of the
New York Stock Exchange, sent a letter to the Presidents of all listed
corporations describing the impact of the proposed “Securities Exchange Act”
bill.11 He commented on Section 20(b) as follows:
Sec. 19 (page 24) makes every person who controls another,
through stock ownership, agency or otherwise or through any
agreement or understanding, liable for the acts of the controlled
person to the same extent as if such acts were his own. In like
manner, the acts of any spouse or of a child or parent residing
with a person may be imputed to such person for the purpose of
determining liability under the Act.
Soon thereafter, on February 23, 1934, Mr. Whitney expressed another
opinion about the provision:
Section 19 of the bill impose[s] liability upon persons controlling
any other person liable under the provisions of the bill when such
control exists through stock ownership, agency or otherwise or by
any agreement or understanding. These provisions seem to apply
more particularly to corporations and officers, directors and
stockholders of corporations than to exchanges or brokers. There
is, however, one extraordinary provision which might directly
affect brokers.
***
In view of the numerous provisions of the bill, to which criminal penalties are
attached, and the fact that a violation of many of them could occur through
inadvertence, this provision, which makes a man responsible not only for his

10

See supra, note 6.

Letter from Richard Whitney “To the Presidents of All Listed Corporations” (February 14,
1934) (identifying his concerns about the draft provisions of the ’34 Act, “which would seriously
affect listed corporations and their officers, directors and principal stockholders”).
http://sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1934_0214_ExchangeWhitneyT.pdf (last visited
on March 3, 2014).
11
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own acts, but for the acts of independent persons, may operate in a grossly
unfair manner.12
[Emphasis added.]
On February 27, 1934, Lowell R. Burch of the New York Airbrake Co.
wrote a letter as follows:
Section 19 contains clauses imputing liability for the acts of socalled “controlled” persons, including not only those controlled by
stock ownership or agency, but also a spouse, child, or parent
residing with the person to whom liability is to be imputed in the
absence of proof of nonapproval or that the transaction was not
for the purpose of evading a provision of the act.13
On February 28, 1934, Sidney Blumenthal of Sidney Blumenthal & Co.,
Inc., wrote a letter stating:
Sec. 19, page 24: This section seems to be particularly dangerous
to trustees handling investments assigned to them by persons who
are at the same time officers or directors and who still have a right
of joining with the trustee in an advisory capacity, possibly
influencing their decision. Thus, the director or officer of a
company owning securities may have deposited some of the
securities in behalf of certain beneficiaries under trust agreements,
and may exercise his knowledge and judgment in behalf of such
trust beneficiaries quite differently from that with which he would
view his own interests. It would seem that this section would
make it inadvisable for any beneficiary of such trust to own any
securities in the company in which one of the trustees may be
interested, even though the trustee is fully familiar with, and
knows all about this business, and knows very little about other
businesses in which the beneficiary would otherwise have to be
interested, if such a course were made necessary by the sale of

Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings before the H. Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm. on H.R. 7852
and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong. 228 (1934) (statement of Mr. Whitney).

12

Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings before the S. Banking and Currency Comm. on S. Res. 84 (72nd
Congress) and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73rd Congress), 73d Cong. 7022 (1934) (statement of Mr.
Lowell Burch).

13
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securities in the company of which the co-trustee is an officer, and
the reinvestment of funds in other companies.14
On February 28, 1934, Thomas G. Corcoran, an attorney and one of the
co-drafters of the ’34 Act, observed that the purpose of Section 19 is “to prevent
evasion of the provisions of the section by organizing dummies who will
undertake the actual things forbidden by the section.”15 According to Mr.
Corcoran, if a bank or a brokerage controlled a separate corporation that bought
and dealt in securities, then the bank or brokerage would be responsible for the
acts of the separate corporation.16 However, a controlling originating entity that
set up a separate corporation and ceded control would not be subject to any
liability under the act.17
On March 6, 1934, Frank R. Hope, President of the Association of Stock
Exchange Firms, New York City, contended:
Section 19 is entitled “Liability of Controlled Persons” and
contains drastic provisions making every person who controls
another through stock ownership, agency or otherwise liable for
the acts of the controlled person as if such acts were his own.
What is meant by a controlled person is not described and,
therefore, the full effect of this section cannot be understood.
There are many liabilities established for individuals by the bill and
to what extent an individual is a controlled person within the
meaning of this section is difficult to understand.18
On March 8, 1934, a Memorandum (draft), of unknown authorship,
suggested amendments to Section 19:
I would suggest that subsections (a) and (b) be redrafted and made
specifically to cover (1) the controller of a dummy corporation or
Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings before the S. Banking and Currency Comm. on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.)
and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.), 73d Cong. 7267 (1934) (statement of Mr. Sidney
Blumenthal, Sidney Blumenthal & Co.).
14

Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings before the S. Banking and Currency Comm. on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.)
and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.), 73d Cong. 6571 (1934) (statement of Mr. Thomas
Corcoran, co-drafter of the Act).
15

16

Id. at 6572.

17

Id.

Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings before the S. Banking and Currency Comm. on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.)
and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.), 73d Cong. 6915 (1934) (statement of Mr. Frank Hope,
President of Association of Stock Exchange Firms).
18
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individual; (2) a principal who actually authorizes the transaction
in question; (3) authorization given under circumstances not
amounting to Agency. The difficulty with the present language is
that it may include liability for unauthorized acts of an agent who
has been chosen with reasonable care. On a literal construction, if
the agent cannot sustain the burden of showing due care, the
principal is automatically liable, regardless of his own good faith
and due care.19
On April 3, 1934, a proposal to amend Section 19(b) was offered as
follows:
(b) Amend to read: “It shall be unlawful for any person, for the
purpose of avoiding any provision of this Act or any rule or
regulation thereunder to do, directly or indirectly, through or by
means of any other person who is controlled by or through stock
ownership, agency, or otherwise by such person or by such
persons and one or more other persons, or who is under such
direct or indirect common control with such person, any act or
thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do under the
provisions of this Act or any rule or regulation thereunder.”20
[Emphasis appears in the original.]
On April 30, 1934, Representative Sam Rayburn, from the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, presented a report on the Securities Exchange
Bill with a recommendation that it be passed.21 In the version presented by the
House, Section 19 concerned “Liabilities of Controlling Persons” and subsection
(b) made it “unlawful for any person to do, through any other person, anything
that he is forbidden to do himself.”22 Representative Rayburn’s report stated as
follows:

Memorandum (draft) Suggested Amendments to the “present” Bill, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (Pub. L. No. 291, 73d Cong., 48 Stat 881, (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 78).

19

THE SECURITIES

Memorandum Re Amendments to Draft of April 3, 1934 – (First Committee Print),
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (Pub. L. No. 291, 73d
Congress, 48 Stat 881, (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78).

20

H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 26 (1934) reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 26 (2001).

21

22

Id.
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In this section and in Section 11, when reference is made to
“control”, the term is intended to include actual control as well as
what has been called legally enforceable control (See Handy &
Harmon v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 135 (1931). It was thought undesirable
to attempt to define the term. It would be difficult if not
impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which
actual control may be exerted. A few examples of the methods
used are stock ownership, lease, contract, and agency. It is well
known that actual control sometimes may be exerted through
ownership of much less than a majority of the stock of a
corporation either by the ownership of such stock alone or
through such ownership in combination with other factors.23
On May 4, 1934, an amendment was offered by Representative Hollister
to strike Section 19(a), which makes it an unlawful act if it is performed by a
controlling person.24 He proposed using the term agent instead of controlling
person because he believed the phrase “controlling person” was nonsensical and
had no legal precedent.25 His other concern was that Section 19(b) would open
the possibility of strike suits, “…to attack an honest man under this bill merely
because he may have wealth, or because he might have some connection with a
corporation which has made a report of some kind or another.” In spite of his
comments, the proposed amendment was rejected, and as Representative Lea
explained, “the object of this provision is to catch the man who stands
behind the scenes and controls the man who is in a nominal position of
authority.”26 Representative Lea also clarified that relying on an agency theory
will not accomplish the same thing – the rationale being that the dummy ought to
be responsible because he is the real party in interest.27
On May 11, 1934, a letter signed by a committee affiliated with the
National Association of Manufacturers was read into the record: “This section
should be substantially modified. Liability of a controlling person should be
limited to cases where the controlling person makes use of other persons in order
to evade the act.”28 However, the Senate did not discuss the proposed
23

Id.

24

78 CONG. REC. 8086, 8094 (1934) (statement of Rep. Hollister).

25

Id.

26

78 CONG. REC. 8086,8095 (1934) (statement of Rep. Lea).

27

Id.

28

78 CONG. REC. 8563,8581 (1934).
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amendment and on June 6, 1934, the bill went into law and the language of
Section 20(b), later codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b), has remained the same since
that time:
§ 78t. Liability of controlling persons and persons who aid
and abet violations
***
(b) Unlawful activity through or by means of any other person
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any
act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do
under the provisions of this title or any rule or regulation
thereunder through or by means of any other person.
On May 12, 1934, Section 19 was renumbered and became Section 20 of the ’34
Act.29
III. ANALYSIS OF PERTINENT CASE LAW
A. Prior Relevant Case Law Before the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
1. Handy & Harmon v. Burnet
In Handy & Harman, the Court examined whether the six majority
shareholders who held 75% of the stock in the Handy & Harman Corporation
“controlled” the 20% of stock owned by Hamilton & De Loss, Inc., a separate
corporation.30 The specific tax issue was whether the two corporations were
affiliated within Section 240(a) of the Revenue Act of 1918.31 This arose because
Hamilton, the president of Hamilton & De Loss, Inc., had pledged his shares to
one of the majority stockholders as collateral for a loan.32 Also, the Court noted
Mr. Hamilton had never opposed any of the majority shareholders.33
Consequently, based on these facts, the Court concluded that Hamilton did not
have legally enforceable control and the majority shareholders were the ones who
exerted actual control.34

29

78 CONG. REC. 8666,8708 (1934).

30

Handy & Harmon v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1931).

31

Id. at 138.

32

Id. at 139.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 140.
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This case was an interesting choice for the drafters of the ’34 Act to rely
upon to distinguish between actual and legally enforceable control. Although this
distinction has been used sparingly since that time, out of nine reported decisions,
nearly all of which concern Section 20(a) claims, only one case involving a Section
20(b) claim mentions the concept of legally enforceable control.35 In spite of this
scant treatment, one commentator opined that in applying the logic behind the
Court’s decision with Section 20(b), “this indicates an intent to require some
degree of realistic control, as would be provided by legal or actual control.”36
B. Subsequent Private Actions Involving Section 20(b) After 1934
There are four major cases evaluating Section 20(b) claims in varying
degrees of depth that have been decided since 1967 and a summary of these
decisions is set forth in chronological order. One of the issues arising in
evaluating Section 20(b) claims is that it is frequently tacked on to discussions
concerning Section 20(a). However, there are differences between the two subsections and the distinctions have not been consistently recognized by the courts
and even commentators who often confuse the two provisions. Accordingly,
other cases with minimal relevance and negligible treatment of Section 20(b) were
consciously omitted.
1. Myzel v. Fields
Lakeside Plastics and Engraving Co. (“LPE”) was organized in 1946 by
cousins, Zelman and Clarence Levine, as a small plastics corporation to make
advertising signs.37 Upon its original issue there were 1,140 shares of common
stock issued to some 17 persons, at a par value of $50 per share.38 In 1948, a sales
agency, entitled Lakeside Plastics Sales Co. (“LPS”) was organized by Orrin and
William Levine, brothers of Clarence Levine, who were also original stockholders
and directors of LPE.39 “From 1953 to sometime in 1957, the stock of LPE
became totally vested in the hands of the four Levines and [LPS]”.40 “By 1958,
35

Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990).

William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-Aiding and Abetting
Conspiracy,
36

Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 357
(1989).
37

Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 728 (8th Cir. 1967).

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id.
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640 shares of LPE were owned by LPS.”41 Around that time, a one-fourth
interest in LPS was sold to Zelman and Clarence Levine.42 In 1961, LPE reacquired 640 shares of its stock as part of a merger with Lakeside Properties, Inc.
(“LPI”), and it then retired the shares.43 The remaining 500 shares of LPE stock,
then owned one-quarter each by the Levines, was in turn exchanged for 500,000
shares of [a newly formed corporation called Lakeside Industries, Inc. (LII)]”.44
Thereafter, 150,000 additional shares of LII were offered for sale at $9 per
share.”45
Although the company struggled from 1946 to 1951, it entered into a
large contract in 1951.46 Thereafter, in 1953, sales zoomed but the company failed
to disclose it had made a $30,000 profit.47 The Myzel brothers were friends of the
Levines.48 Although the company’s sales and prospects were improving, they
made the following representations to the shareholders: “(1) the stock was not
worth anything, (2) the company was making no money, and (3) Myzel had sold
his own stock.”49
At trial, the court instructed that “the Levines were liable for the acts of
[the Myzels] ‘if they knew or should have known” that the Myzels were
‘purchasing’ the stock for the Levines ‘or with the intention of reselling’ to
them.”50 The appellees argued that “‘a plan’ existed to obtain the stock for the
Levines, and … that if such existed the Levines would be liable for any fraud that
the Myzels committed.51 The trial court emphasized that the Levines must ‘know
and approve’ of the Myzel activities in order to be liable.52 The court added that
there could be no liability of the Levines ‘if they had not sought to have the
41

Id.

42

Id. at 728-29.

43

Id. at 729.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 730.

48

Id. at 729.

49

Id. at 730.

50

Id. at 737.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 737-38.
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Myzels obtain it.’”53 On appeal, the court stated the liability of the Levines is
governed neither by principles of agency nor conspiracy.54
The appellants argued “that the instruction omits as a prerequisite to
liability that under the ‘plan’ the Levines also must know that the method to be
used by the Myzels would be unlawful, relying upon common law conspiracy
cases.”55 The court rejected this argument, stating as follows:
However, where the evidence shows the ‘controlling person’ is the
actual intended beneficiary of the stock purchase, ‘control’ under
the Act does not require knowledge of the specific wrongdoing
any more than a principal must know in advance of his agent's
fraud. All that is required is that the controlling person ‘directly or
indirectly’ induces the purchase. Under such circumstances, if the
direct purchaser fails to disclose material information in violation
of Rule 10b-5, the ‘controlling person’ cannot excuse himself,
even under the ‘good faith’ clause of Section 20(a). To hold
otherwise would vitiate the plain meaning of Section 20(b), that one cannot do
indirectly through another what he cannot do himself. Therefore, even
assuming arguendo, that there was failure to properly instruct
under a civil or criminal conspiracy theory, the language of Section
20 obviates any possible prejudicial effect. Furthermore, the court
not only required the Levines to know of Myzels' activities, but
required ‘approval’ of them, before they were responsible. Such
requirements are neither explicit not implicit in the Act. We think
this qualified instruction adequately protected the rights of all
appellants.56
While Myzel is mildly instructive in its discussion of controlling persons, it
subsequently received negative treatment by the Eighth Circuit and other
jurisdictions, so its relevance to Section 20(b) claims is limited.
2. Nelson v. Nat'l Republic Bank of Chicago
This district court case was filed by investors who alleged that the
defendants, through a course of willful nondisclosure, caused bonds to be placed

53

Id. at 738.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 738-39. (emphasis added).
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in the interstate market for sale to plaintiff.57 Also, “[p]laintiffs allegedly would
not have purchased the bonds if various defendants had disclosed information
that they had a legal obligation to reveal.”58 Plaintiff further alleged “that the
defendants had an obligation to reveal this information, and that their failure to
do so ultimately caused damage to plaintiff when the bond issuers went
bankrupt.”59 One count was directed at the bank, an insurer and multiple
individual defendants as controlling persons under Sections 15 and 20 of the 1934
Act.60 This specific allegation was that the bank controlled the activities of an
individual, the insurer controlled the bank, multiple individuals controlled the
bank, and the directors of a broker-dealer controlled the activities of the brokerdealer.61
In rejecting the bank’s motion to dismiss this particular claim for relief,
the court emphasized twice that Section 20(b) provides for broad liability and it
held that the directors of the broker-dealer may be considered controlling persons
for violations of the Exchange Act.62 As a result, the court denied the motion to
dismiss and the Section 20(b) claim was allowed to proceed.63
This case remains good law and it is noteworthy because it has been cited
positively for the proposition that directors and executive officers normally would
constitute a controlling group.64
3. Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp.
“Emil Wilkowski, a dishonest securities salesman, embezzled money
entrusted to him by four clients.”65 Wilkowski also failed to inform the National
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) of a prior forgery conviction in his
application for registration with the NASD.66 Regardless, Wilkowski was
Nelson v. Nat'l Republic Bank of Chicago, No. 80 C 6401, 1984 WL 2424, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
1984).

57

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id. at *7.

61

Id.

62

Id. at *8.

63

Id.

See ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS, § 11:4
(2015).

64

65

Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1566 (9th Cir. 1990).

66

Id.
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convicted of criminal securities fraud and grand theft.67 Thereafter, the victimized
investors sought to recover their losses from the brokerage firm, Titan, and a
financial counseling firm with which Wilkowski was associated.68 One of the
investors’ claims was that Titan was primarily liable under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act
and Rule 10b-5 for failing to disclose to investors Wilkowski’s prior forgery
conviction.69 Additionally, the court considered whether Titan, a broker-dealer,
was a “controlling person” with respect to its registered representatives within the
meaning of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act.70
The district court determined Titan was not a “controlling person” within
Section 20(a) for two reasons: (1) “Titan had no “power or influence” over
Wilkowski because he was an independent contractor and Titan did not exercise
any control over Wilkowski's defalcation of funds; [Titan] did not benefit from
the defalcation of funds; and did not authorize Wilkowski to receive personal
checks”; and, (2) “because Titan and Wilkowski had contractually agreed
Wilkowski would be an independent contractor, Titan had no duty to supervise
unauthorized and unknown transactions and therefore could not have been a
‘culpable participant’ in Wilkowski’s misdeeds.71 However, the Ninth Circuit
reversed on this issue, accepting the SEC’s arguments, supplied in its amicus
curiae brief, that a broker-dealer is a controlling person under Section 20(a) with
respect to its registered representatives.72 The SEC also contended “that the
representative/broker-dealer relationship is necessarily one of controlled and
controlling person because the broker-dealer is required to supervise its
representatives.”73 Moreover, the SEC asserted “the broker-dealer exercises
control over its registered representatives because the representatives need the
broker-dealer to gain access to the securities markets.”74 Adopting the SEC’s
position, the Ninth Circuit rejected Titan’s “argument that broker-dealers can
avoid a duty to supervise simply by entering into a contract that purports to make

67

Id. at 1567.

68

Id. at 1566.

69

Id. at 1572.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 1572-73.

72

Id. at 1574.

73

Id. at 1573.

74

Id.
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the representative, who is not himself registered under the Act as a broker-dealer,
an ‘independent contractor.’”75
In Section IV of the majority opinion, the investors “also claim[ed] on
appeal that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Titan on
[their] claim that Titan was secondarily liable for Wilkowski’s Section 10(b)
violation under the common law theory of respondeat superior.”76 The Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded the matter, permitting the investors to move forward with
their theories of liability based on both Section 20(a) and respondeat superior.77 The
court stated that Section 20(a) was intended to “to prevent evasion” of the law
“by organizing dummies who will undertake the actual things forbidden.”78 The
court asserted that Section 20(a) “was intended to impose liability on controlling
persons, such as controlling shareholders and corporate officers, who would not
be liable under respondeat superior because they were not the actual employers.79
Thus, [the court reasoned that Congress, by] enacting Section 20(a), … expanded
upon the common law and … created a defense (the good faith defense) that
would be available only to those who, under common law principles of
respondeat superior, would have faced no liability at all.”80 As part of this, the
court believed that Congress expanded the common law by enacting Section 20(a)
to permit a comprehensive statutory scheme to protect the public.81 It also
considered the following possibilities that may flow from controlling persons:
When both remedies are available, then the agent who personally
committed the wrong is primarily liable (based on proof of his
actions or omissions, and on scienter when required); the principal
who acts through the agent (assuming the agent is acting within
the scope of his agency) is secondarily liable; and other persons
who are not subject to respondeat superior but who nevertheless
control the wrongdoer can be held liable under § 20(a). Because
the liability of persons under § 20(a) represents an extension of
liability, beyond that imposed by the common law, such persons
75
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are afforded statutory defenses not available in the principal-agent
context. Controlling persons may thus avoid liability under § 20(a)
by demonstrating that they acted in “good faith” within the
meaning of that section.82
Notably, the dissent, written by Circuit Judge Hall, disagreed with the
majority’s opinion in Section IV.83 Circuit Judge Hall took a different view of the
legislative history of Section 20(a) and believed that preventing “dummy”
corporations from escaping liability was only one purpose and that the primary
purpose was to limit liability to those whose conduct is in some sense culpable.84
Instead, she argued that Section 20(a) was modeled on Section 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933, which rejected the notion of “insurer” liability.85 The basis
for her reasoning was from Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,86:
Legislative history reveals that the Senate and the House had
advocated different versions of the standard that should govern
controlling persons. The House proposed that the standard
should be a “fiduciary standard,” which would require a duty of
due care. (H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933); H.R.
Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).) On the other hand,
the Senate proposed an “insurer's liability” (S. Rep. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933), the Fletcher Report). Congress enacted
the House version, rejecting the insurer concept.87
Additionally, she characterized the majority’s reading of the legislative
history as “illogical” because Congress would not have enacted Sections 20(a) and
(b) to catch “dummy” organizations and give them a good faith defense but deny
this for ordinary controlling persons such as employers.88 Accordingly, she
contended that holding an employer liable for securities fraud committed by an
employee without proof of fault would violate the express language of the Act.89
82
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Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d at 1580 (citing Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665,
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This is because Section 20(a) extends the good faith defense to employers and
there is no justification for expanding employer liability under respondeat
superior.90 Thus, she objected to holding broker-dealers secondarily liable under
the common law doctrine of respondeat superior because it would render Section
20(a) superfluous, “for [employers] would be responsible despite their having
fulfilled a stringent good faith test based on their having maintained and enforced
reasonable and proper supervision and internal controls.”91
4. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders
a. Factual Background
In this case, “First Derivative Traders (First Derivative) represent[ed]
shareholders who owned mutual funds.”92 Janus Capital Group (JCG) was the
parent company and creator of Janus Investment Fund.93 JCG’s subsidiary, Janus
Capital Management (JCM) was the fund’s administrator and investment adviser.94
The Janus Investment Fund (JIF) was a separate legal entity owned entirely by
mutual fund investors and was not included as a party to this lawsuit.95 During
the relevant period of time, “all of [JIF’s] officers were also officers of JCM [and]
one member of JCF’s board of trustees was also associated with JCM.”96
JIF issued a prospectus in February 2002 stating the funds were not
suitable for market timing, but by September 2003 it came to light that JCG had
entered into secret arrangements to permit market timing in several of JCM’s
funds.97 Thereafter, First Derivative filed a complaint for violations of Rule 10b-5
and §10b of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.98 Justice Breyer
characterized this as a “typical” Rule 10b-5 “fraud on the market” claim with First
Derivative alleging JCM made statements creating the misleading impression it
would implement measures to curb market timing.99 Additionally, First
90
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Derivative alleged JCG was liable for JCM’s acts as a “controlling person” under
Section 20(a).100
b. The Majority’s Opinion
Although the Fourth Circuit determined that First Derivative sufficiently
alleged that JCG and JCM made the misleading statements because they
participated in the writing and dissemination of the prospectuses, the Supreme
Court reversed.101 Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Thomas concluded that
the “maker” of a statement is the “person or entity with ultimate authority over
the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.”102
Specifically, this meant that JCM could not be liable because it did not “make”
any of the statements in the JIF prospectuses.103 This decision was reached in
spite of the Court acknowledging that First Derivative “persuasively argue that
investment advisers exercise significant influence over their client funds” because
JCM and JCF were legally separate entities and corporate formalities were
observed here.104 Moreover, reapportioning liability is “properly the responsibility
of Congress and not the courts.”105
Concerning the Section 20(a) claim for control person liability, the Court
agreed that First Derivative’s theory “resembles the liability imposed by Congress
for control.”106 However, it declined to adopt the theory because it would “[]read
into Rule 10b–5 a theory of liability similar to—but broader in application than,
see post, at 2310 — what Congress has already created expressly elsewhere.”107
Also, even if JCM was significantly involved in drafting the prospectus, it did not
make any of the statements because JIF had “ultimate control.”108
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Id. at 2305.

104
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Id. In a footnote, Justice Thomas also commented: “We do not address whether Congress
created liability for entities that act through innocent intermediaries in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(b).” Id. at
2304 n. 10.
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c. Justice Breyer’s Dissent
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that many different individuals and
company representatives “might ‘make’” statements in a prospectus -- even if the
board of directors has ultimate content-related responsibility.”109 Also, he framed
the main issue as whether JCM is primarily liable for violating the Act, not
whether it simply helped others violate the Act.110 Additionally, he contended
there is no basis for the majority’s view that its rule is necessary to avoid a “theory
of liability similar to – but broader in application than” Section 20(a)’s control
person liability.111 This is because the Court previously held that the possibility of
an express remedy under the securities laws does not preclude a claim under §
10(b).112 Thus, in reviewing the facts, Justice Breyer determined that JCM “made”
the fraudulent statements about market timing in the prospectuses and concluded
JCM was liable, stating: “as long as some managers, sometimes, can be held to
have ‘ma[d]e’ a materially false statement, [JCM] can be held to have done so on
the facts alleged here.”113
Moreover, Justice Breyer stated his concern that the majority’s rule would
make it unlikely the SEC could pursue primary violators who “make” false
statements or pursue aiders and abettors.114 This is because managers would not
be liable as principals because they did not “make” the statement and there would
be no other primary violator that might have tried to “aid” or “abet.”115
Therefore, this is problematic because it may well create a loophole which
Congress did not intend in enacting the securities laws.116 In this regard,
addressing the majority’s footnote concerning Section 20(b), Justice Breyer stated,
as follows:
If the majority believes, as its footnote hints, that § 20(b) could
provide a basis for liability in this case, ante, at 2304, n. 10, then it
should remand the case for possible amendment of the complaint.
‘There is a dearth of authority construing Section 20(b),’ which
109
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has been thought largely ‘superfluous in 10b–5 cases.’ 5B A.
Jacobs, Disclosure and Remedies Under the Securities Law § 11–
8, p. 11–72 (2011). Hence respondent, who reasonably thought
that it referred to the proper securities law provision, is faultless
for failing to mention § 20(b) as well.117
Remarkably, Justice Breyer also addressed the issue of whether JCM could
have “ma[d]e” the false statements in the prospectuses at issue and concluded
affirmatively that it did.118 He opined that the specific relationships alleged
among JCM, the JIF, and the prospectus statements warrant the conclusion that
JCM did “make” those statements.119 However, because Justice Breyer reached
this particular conclusion, he did not evaluate the potential success or failure of a
Section 20(b) claim.
C. Securities and Exchange Commission Actions Involving Section 20(b) After 1934
1. Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey120
“This was an action to enjoin corporate officials personally for alleged
corporate violations of federal securities laws.”121 In this case, a corporation,
King Resources, sold two-year corporate notes to a state treasurer.122 The SEC
asserted that King was a controlling person within section 20(a) of the 1934 Act
and that it may be inferred from the District Court's holding that he failed to
establish a ‘good faith’ defense, since the District Court ruled against King.123
The Sixth Circuit rejected the SEC’s position and held that section 20(a)
of the 1934 Act may not be relied upon by the SEC in an injunctive enforcement
action.124 Instead, the court stated that Section 20(b) of the 1934 Act provides for
the unlawful actions of controlling persons, and the SEC may only seek
injunctions against unlawful actions.125 Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act makes a
117
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Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974).
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This part of the Sixth Circuit’s holding concerning injunctive relief as the sole means to address
unlawful action under Section 20(b) has been challenged as being of “questionable” validity. See,
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 11:8 (2015).
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controlling person liable “to any person to whom such controlled person is
liable.”126 “As a matter of legislative interpretation, [the court held] that the SEC
is not a person under section 20(a), since section 20(a) was meant to specify the
liability of controlling persons to private persons suing to vindicate their interests.
Section 20(b) sets forth the standard of lawfulness to which a controlling person
must conform, on penalty of liability in injunction to the SEC or criminal
prosecution.” 127
“Under section 20(b), [a party must show] knowing use of a controlled
person by a controlling person before a controlling person comes within its
ambit.128 Without such a restriction, every link in a chain of command would be
personally criminally and civilly liable for the violations of inferior corporate
agents.129 This was not the congressional intent in enacting section 20(b).”130
Accordingly, the court concluded that King, board chairman of King Resources
Co, did not aid-abet misrepresentations and omissions concerning King
Resources made by an intermediary "money finder" in selling King Resources
securities to the State of Ohio.131 Also, there was no evidence King knew of the
misrepresentations and omissions, nor that he knowingly assisted or intended to
aid.132
Because this case is based on unsupported assumptions regarding the
legislative history and reaches a number of fatally flawed conclusions, a thorough
analysis and criticism of its reasoning appears in Section V, below.
2. Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Savoy Industries, Inc.
The SEC alleged that Zimmerman, or a group of which Zimmerman was
a member, controlled Savoy Industries.133 Under this “control” branch of
liability, the SEC maintained that Zimmerman was liable vicariously for Savoy
promulgating or filing documents, including an “allegedly misleading Form 8-K,
Form 10-K, American Stock Exchange listing application, and letter to
126
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stockholders.”134 In essence, Zimmerman failed to disclose his identity and role
in a takeover transaction in Savoy’s filings.135
In its analysis, the D.C. Circuit stated as follows: “The history of the
interpretation of [S]ection 20 in the courts has hardly been a history of
consistency, especially in the context of SEC enforcement actions.”136 The court
acknowledged the Second Circuit has suggested that section 20(a) is available to
the Commission in enforcement proceedings in Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Management
Dynamics, Inc.,137 where the court stated that “(w)e agree with the Commission that
with respect to SEC enforcement actions, Section 20(a) was not intended as the
sole measure of employer liability.”138
The D.C. Circuit assumed that Section 20(a) was available for the SEC to
pursue, but the court remanded the matter for further findings.139 The court
noted it was troubled by the fact that the district court did not recite its statutory
basis for imposing liability on Zimmerman.140 It also stated there was “no specific
finding that Zimmerman used Savoy knowingly.”141 Moreover, the court wanted
to see a finding that Zimmerman used Savoy, but the evidence was speculative
and did not convince the court to affirm on a Section 20(b) theory.142 In sum, the
court wanted to see more persuasive evidence that Zimmerman controlled Savoy
to accomplish the securities violation.143
On remand, the District Court found that Zimmerman controlled both
the takeover group and Savoy, through its officers and directors, during the
period of dissemination of the false and misleading documents at issue in the
litigation.144 Accordingly, the District Court held Zimmerman responsible under
Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(d), 20(a), and 20(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
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1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.145 And on appeal after remand, the district
court’s findings were upheld.146
3. Dirks v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n
In this matter, the Supreme Court devoted one line of the opinion to
Section 20(b) claims, as follows:
Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship
from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their
advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider
for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for
their personal gain.147
Stated differently, because Section 20(b) makes illegal violations of the 1934 Act
committed “through or by means of any other person,” the Court reasoned that it
outlawed trades by tippees that benefit insiders.148 While Dirks has received some
negative treatment since it was decided with a number of jurisdictions declining to
follow the opinion, in this context it remains good law.
4. Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Stringer149
In this matter, the SEC contended it had standing to bring an
enforcement action against a control person under Section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act.150 The dispute concerned the burden of proof under Section 20(a) as
compared to Section 20(b).151 According to the court, Section 20(a) shifts to the
alleged controlling person the affirmative obligation to negate his or her role in
the conduct underlying the claim by proving that he “acted in good faith and did
not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause
of action.”152 In contrast, the court found that Section 20(b) contains no such
provision and leaves the burden of proof against a control person squarely on the
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SEC.153 The court stated the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue and that
two of the other circuits disagree.154 The SEC argued and the Second Circuit
previously held that the SEC may bring an enforcement action under Section
20(a).155 But, Stringer and the Sixth Circuit156 take the opposite view.157 In this
opinion, the District court concluded “the only way to harmonize the two
provisions … is to read § 20(a) as a private claim and § 20(b) as an enforcement
claim.”158
In examining Section 20(b), the court finds it is “specifically geared
toward government enforcement actions. Section 20(b) is [titled] ‘unlawful
activity through or by means of any other person’ and provides a mechanism for
the SEC to enforce violations of the securities laws committed ‘through or by
means of’ other persons.159 Notably, the court also states that “Sections 20(a) and
20(b) create secondary liability [, the] difference being that Section 20(a) puts the
burden on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense to avoid liability.”160
The opinion also comments on both Sections 20(b) and 20(c) using the term
“unlawful” and this is noticeably absent in Section 20(a) which instead uses the
term “liable.”161 As a result, the court determined “[t]his difference in
153

Id.
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See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2nd Cir. 1996), cert
denied, 522 U.S. 812, 118 S.Ct. 57, 139 L.Ed.2d 21 (1997).
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that because § 20(b) of the Exchange Act “sets forth the standard
of lawfulness to which a controlling person must conform, on penalty of liability in injunction to
the SEC or criminal prosecution,” § 20(a) was meant only “to specify the liability of controlling
persons to private persons suing to vindicate their interests.” Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey, 493
F.2d 1304 (6th Cir.1974). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that the SEC was “not a person
under section 20(a)” and that the SEC could not rely on § 20(a) when seeking personal injunctions
against corporate officials for a corporation's alleged violations of the securities laws. Sec. Exch.
Comm’n v. J.W. Barclay & Co., Inc., 442 F.3d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, the DoddFrank Act effectively resolved the debate among the circuit courts by explicitly granting the SEC
standing to bring Section 20(a) claims. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §929P(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010).
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terminology cannot be ignored and lends credence to the interpretation that
Section 20(a) does not include an enforcement action by the SEC.”162
Here, “the SEC argued Section 20(b) was intended as an ‘aiding and
abetting catch-all’ provision to allow the SEC to pursue an enforcement action
against officers and directors for violating any provision of the securities laws that
does not itself have the ‘direct or indirect’ language.163 However, the court
rejected this argument using the reasoning of Central Bank,” stating that the
“directly or indirectly” language shows that “Congress ... intended to reach all
persons who engage, even if only indirectly, in proscribed activities connected
with securities transactions.”164165 Also, “aiding and abetting liability extends
beyond persons who engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed activity; aiding and
abetting liability reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at
all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do.”166 Moreover, “allowing
enforcement actions by the SEC under Section 20(a) would render Section 20(b)
superfluous.”167 This is because “[u]nder Section 20(b), the scienter requirement
will differ depending on the underlying violation.”168 “Section 20(a) has no
scienter requirement, but instead allows a control person to raise the good faith
defense.”169
Regardless, the court also analyzed two situations the SEC identified
where the SEC argued “it would be unable to pursue an enforcement action
under Section 20(b), but would be able to do so under Section 20(a).170 First is
the situation where a director, acting in good faith, orders the corporation to take
an action without knowing how the action could be used by the corporation, and
the corporation takes that action which violates the securities laws.171 In that
situation, the director may have acted in “good faith,” but did not induce the
162
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violation to occur and, therefore, cannot prove the Section 20(a) defense.172 The
second scenario is where a CEO orders the corporation's finance department to
reduce expenses and the sales department to increase revenues, and then imposes
unrealistic goals with incentives, resulting in a securities violation by the
corporation.173 In that situation, even though the CEO may not have induced the
corporate act, he did not act in “good faith” and, therefore, cannot prove the
Section 20(a) defense.174 Although these examples on their face would allow
enforcement under Section 20(a), they also appear to allow enforcement under
Section 20(b) under the theory that the person “indirectly” did some act which
violated the securities laws.”175
This last comment was an interesting and unexpected result by the court,
which concluded that both sections impose secondary liability on persons who act
by and through others.176 Whether or not this latter point has any merit will be
examined later, as there is questionable support for the court’s rationale.
5. Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. J.W. Barclay & Co.
The SEC initiated administrative proceedings against Barclay, determined
there were multiple violations and ordered Barclay to pay a $25,000 penalty.177
Thereafter, Barclay ceased operations as a broker-dealer and violated the SEC’s
net capital requirements.178 Also, one of Barclay’s founders, who also happened
to be Barclay’s President and a majority shareholder, John Bruno, directed Barclay
not to use any of its funds to pay any part of the $25,000 penalty.179 As a result,
the SEC filed an application against Barclay and Bruno in District Court.180
Bruno argued that the SEC could not assert control person liability against him
under Section 20(a) “and hold him responsible for the civil penalty against
Barclay” because Bruno was not a party to the proceedings before the SEC and
no order was issued against him.181
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The District Court granted the SEC’s motion for summary judgment,
Bruno appealed and the Third Circuit appointed an attorney as amicus curiae to
address whether the SEC has standing to bring a control person claim under
Section 20(a).182 Here, the Third Circuit stated that “in order for Bruno to be
jointly and severally liable under § 20(a): (1) the SEC has to be a person; (2) to
whom the controlled person, Barclay, was liable; (3) as a result of some act or acts
constituting a violation or cause of action under any provision of the Exchange
Act or any rule or regulation thereunder.”183 Holding that the SEC is a person
within the meaning of Section 20(a) and declining to join in the Sixth Circuit’s
contrary holding in Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey, the Third Circuit stated that the
relevant liability of the controlled person for the purpose of defining the control
person's joint and several liability under § 20(a) is the controlled person's
obligation to pay some amount to a creditor when that claim for payment arises
under the securities laws.184 And because the facts were uncontested, Barclay was
found to be liable under Section 20(a) for the unpaid penalty.185 Also, Bruno,
having controlled Barclay, induced and was a culpable participant in the act
constituting the cause of action, and was jointly and severally liable for the
penalty.186 In reaching its conclusion, the Third Circuit stated, as follows:
We further note that our construction of Section 20(a) serves the
remedial purposes of the Exchange Act. With a more narrow
construction of Section 20(a), the deterrent effects of civil
penalties arising under the Exchange Act would be diluted in cases
such as this one where a closely-held firm is subject to a penalty,
and the persons controlling the firm transfer the firm's assets to
themselves, causing the firm to be unable to pay its penalty.
Although Section 20(b) may provide an overlapping remedy in
some such cases, control persons who induce the transfers of the
firm's assets to themselves may not have participated in the
underlying violations. In that sense, our cumulative construction
of Section 20(b) and Section 20(a) targets different forms of
wrongdoing, and thus Section 20(a), given our construction, could
reach wrongdoers who might otherwise escape liability under
182
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Id. at 841.
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Section 20(b). Consequently, our construction of Section 20(a) is
also supported by the remedial purposes of the Exchange Act.187
In a footnote, the Third Circuit also stated that it agreed with the Sixth
Circuit in Coffey that Section 20(b), not Section 20(a), defines the general
“standard of lawfulness to which a controlling person must conform.”188 It also
accepted the reasoning from Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Stringer that while a control
person could be held liable in an SEC enforcement action under Section 20(b) for
certain violations committed by a controlled person, in such a case the SEC itself
would not be an “injured party,” and the defendants in such an enforcement
action would not be “liable to the SEC the way that [they] would be liable to a
private plaintiff.”189
6. Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Daifotis,
In this matter, the court disagreed with the Stringer decision, stating as
follows: “The SEC is a government agency tasked with enforcing federal
securities laws. It is not an injured party.”190 Relying on Security Exchange
Commission v. Zanford,191 the court explained that federal securities laws should be
construed “not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their]
remedial purposes.”192 It also held that the SEC, the very agency charged with
enforcing federal securities laws, can hold control persons liable and that the
opposite result would contradict the purpose of securities laws.193
As a result of this decision, a split exists as to whether the SEC may
pursue claims under Section 20(a). Whether it will be resolved favorably for
FINRA and the SEC remains to be seen, but the natural result should be that the
government enforcement agencies should be able to pursue these claims. This is
because there was no such limit imposed in the language of Section 20(a) or that
arose during the debates on the legislative history.
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Id.
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Id. at 843 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974)).

Barclay, 442 F.3d at 843 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Stringer, No. Civ. 02-1341-ST, 2003 WL
23538011 at *1, *6 (D. Or. Sept. 3, 2003)).
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Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 4714250 at *1, *5 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 7, 2011).
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D. SEC Administrative Decisions
In the 1930s, after the passage of the ’34 Act, the SEC pursued multiple
Section 20(b) claims in conjunction with Section 9 violations. During this period,
the SEC was keen on pursuing brokers and other entities who were using
“matched orders” to buy and sell stock to manipulate the price. While many
examples of the SEC’s cases from this period exist and are easily located, the
overwhelming majority of them concerned setting matters for hearing and did not
result in a meaningful, substantive decision, except for the following matter.
1. In the Matter of Junius A. Richards
In this case, the SEC alleged that Richards, a broker, had reason to believe
that an investment banking firm, Robert Benson & Co., Ltd. (Benson), an English
investment banking firm, and its subsidiary, British Financial Union, Ltd., were
entering orders for the purchase and sale of the common stock of Simplicity
Pattern Company, Inc.194 The SEC’s order stated that Richards also knew that
the banking entities were effecting transactions to create actual or apparent active
trading in the stock to raise its price.195 As a punishment, the SEC suspended
Richards’ membership on multiple exchanges based on his conduct in violation of
Section 19(a)(3).196 However, the SEC also determined that Benson violated
Section 9(a)(1)(B), 9(a)(1)(C), and 9(a)(2) of the ’34 Act for matching orders.197
Furthermore, the SEC’s order concluded that because the transactions were
executed through brokers, the banks were also violating Section 20(b) of the Act,
“which [made] it unlawful for a person to do by means of any other person any
act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do directly.”198 Based
on this language, it suggests that the SEC would have pursued the banks for a
Section 20(b) violation as “controlling persons” over Richards. However, the
record does not reflect whether the SEC ever pursued these claims, which is
unsurprising given the potential difficulty for enforcing violations against foreign
entities in 1939.199

In the Matter of Junius A. Richards, Exchange Act Release No. 708, 4 SEC Docket 742, No. 415, 1939 WL 39102 at *1 (Mar. 24, 1939).
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2. Additional Section 20(b) Claims
In 1986, the SEC issued a litigation release on a case involving insider
trading with alleged violations of Section 20(b) and Rule 10b-5.200 Although the
matter resulted in a settlement with some of the defendants, all of the relief
concerned the insider trading violation, not the Section 20(b) claim.
While the SEC has filed additional complaints alleging Section 20(b)
violations, none of them have been litigated to conclusion since 1986.
E. FINRA Decision Affecting a Section 20(b) Claim
1. In the Matter of Department of Market Regulation v. Gregory Richard Imbruce201
In this matter, Gregory Imbruce was a portfolio manager who supervised
an assistant trader, Peter Berkowitz, for the Madoff Securities’ energy portfolio.202
In these roles, Berkowitz took instructions from Imbruce on trading.203 On
November 14, 2007, Imbruce was heading out of town and called Berkowitz.204
According to Imbruce, he instructed Berkowitz to short $500,000 in value of
“any” energy stock to reduce the portfolio’s net long position.205 Berkowitz
disputed this, testifying that Imbruce instructed him to short sell 10,000 shares of
a specific stock, ATP Oil & Gas Corporation (ATPG). Regardless, Berkowitz did
in fact sell short 10,000 shares of ATPG that day between $52.00 and $53.30 per
share.206 That same day, ATPG filed a prospectus with the SEC and a
supplement stating that “ATPG intended to initiate a secondary public offering of
[five] million shares of common stock at a price of $47.00 per share.”207 After the
market closed, Imbruce submitted an indication of interest on behalf of Madoff

Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of and Call
Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe Int’l Corp., Faisal Al Massoud Al Fuhaid, and Luay
Tewfik Al Swaidi, 81 CIV. 6553 (WCC) (S.D.N.Y.), Exchange Act Release No. 11012, 35 S.E.C.
Docket 183, 1986 WL 70986 at *1 (Feb. 26 1986).
200

In the Matter of Department of Market Regulation v. Gregory Richard Imbruce, 2012 WL
759812 (N.A.S.D.R. Mar. 7, 2012) (Note: This may be cited alternatively as In the Matter of
Department of Market Regulation v. Gregory Richard Imbruce, Complaint No. 2008012137601 (2012)).
201
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Imbruce, 2012 WL 759812, at *1-2.
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Securities to purchase 10,000 shares of ATPG in the secondary public offering.208
The next morning, Imbruce accepted the allocation and Berkowitz was notified of
the purchase, acknowledging the transaction and entering it into Madoff
Securities’ internal system.209 As a result of Imbruce’s purchase of ATPG on
November 15, 2007, coupled with the short sales on November 14, 2007, Madoff
Securities realized a profit of $58,721.26.210
The spike in short sales of ATPG’s stock was observed by market
surveillance, and a complaint was filed against Imbruce alleging that “[he] violated
Exchange Act Rule 105 and NASD Rule 2110 because he purchased shares of
ATPG in a secondary public offering … after he sold the company's stock short
during the restricted period.211 The Hearing Panel found that Imbruce violated
Exchange Act Rule 105 and NASD Rule 2110, as alleged in the complaint.212 It
accepted that Berkowitz’s testimony as credible, that Imbruce’s testimony was not
credible, and that Imbruce had instructed Berkowitz to short sell 10,000 shares of
ATPG.213 On appeal, Imbruce offered a variety of arguments, but FINRA
affirmed that Berkowitz's short sales of ATPG were attributable to Imbruce for
purposes of Exchange Act Rule 105.214
Imbruce argued that Exchange Act Rule 105 required that the same person
effect the short sale and purchase of the subject securities and that he did not
violate Exchange Act Rule 105 because he did not short sell ATPG.215 FINRA
rejected this argument, stating:
Imbruce misunderstands the Exchange Act’s broad, remedial
approach to securities regulation. The Exchange Act, by its own
terms, prohibits individuals from engaging in unlawful activities by
means of other persons. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (2011) (“It shall
be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any act or
thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do under the
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provisions of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder
through or by means of any other person.”).216
Consequently, FINRA determined that Imbruce was responsible for the
subject short sales, despite the fact that Berkowitz executed the actual trades.217
This finding, coupled with the finding that Imbruce purchased ATPG in the
company’s secondary public offering from a participating underwriter, was
sufficient to establish Imbruce’s violation of Exchange Act Rule 105.218
One interesting aspect of this case is that FINRA did not actually charge
Imbruce with a Section 20(b) violation, but instead raised the issue sua sponte.
Why FINRA chose not to pursue a Section 20(b) against Berkowitz and Imbruce
is unclear, especially because no scienter is required to prove a violation of
Exchange Act Rule 105, “…a prophylactic, [that] providing a bright line
demarcation of proscribed conduct, and applies irrespective of a short seller’s
intent.”219 Consequently, it would have been easy for FINRA to prove that
Berkowitz made the short sale as a “controlled person” and that Imbruce was the
“controlling person.” It is possible that Berkowitz’s employment situation
provides a reasonable explanation – his employment with Madoff Securities was
terminated on March 11, 2008 and FINRA admitted it no longer had jurisdiction
over him as of March 11, 2010. 220 Thus, because Berkowitz was apparently no
longer working in the industry as a registered representative, there was little to be
gained in pursuing him from a deterrence standpoint, compared to Imbruce.
Alternatively, it is likely that FINRA was seeking Berkowitz’s testimony in a
cooperative capacity against Imbruce, which would be considerably more difficult
if he was charged as a controlled person. Also, the complaint against Imbruce
was not filed until February 25, 2010, and FINRA’s jurisdiction over Berkowitz
expired two weeks later.The opinion also stated that while Berkowitz appeared
for an interview, he later declined to testify voluntarily at Imbruce’s hearing.
Consequently, it may have been challenging to locate him and easier to pursue
Imbruce. Nevertheless, with the decision having been published on March 7,
2012, it shows that Section 20(b) claims are alive and well.
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Id. at *7, n.27.

217

Id. at 7.

218

Id.

219

Id. at *6.

Pursuant to FINRA’s By-Laws, Art. V, Sec. 4, persons who are no longer registered with a
FINRA firm remains subject to FINRA's jurisdiction for two years after the termination of their
association with a firm. See id. at *5, n.21.
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2. Additional Guidance from FINRA on Section 20(b)
As a prime example of how rarely claims arise under Section 20(b), the
Imbruce decision is the only one to date reported by FINRA. Additionally, the
only other reference to Section 20(b) appears in a 1988 release in Notice 88-62,
Rule 10B-21, which prohibits shorting into secondary offerings.221 The Rule
prohibits purchases of offered securities to cover short sales made during the
specified period and it proscribes covering purchases made directly from an
underwriter, broker, or dealer participating in the offering.222 In particular, the
Release states:
Moreover, such covering purchases effected by prearrangement or
other understanding through other purchasers in the primary
offering are proscribed through the operation of Section 20(b) of
the Exchange Act, which prohibits a person from doing indirectly
any act that he is prohibited from doing directly by the Exchange
Act or any rule thereunder. Thus, the “prearrangement” of the
sort that the NASD believes may have been present in the cases it
investigated would be prohibited by Rule 10b-21(T) through the
operation of Section 20(b).223
In a footnote, the Release further states: “Although Section 20 is entitled
“Liabilities of Controlling Persons,” paragraph (b) is not limited to situations
involving persons in control relationships.”224 While this footnote is intriguing,
without more detail it is challenging to determine what FINRA was
contemplating in this regard.
IV. SUMMARY OF VIEWS PROVIDED BY COMMENTATORS
Since 1934, many commentators have set forth their views on Section
20(b) and its potential use. The following sets forth a summary of their opinions
concerning the legislative history, its application and the meaning behind Section
20(b). For ease of reference, the comments are provided as they were originally
published, in chronological order.
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A. William B. Herlands – 1934
An early analysis of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 examines
“the statutory provisions from the point of view of criminal liability, …
classify[ing] them into one of three general types”:
(1) Absolute and unqualified prohibitions; i.e., statutory provisions
prohibiting the doing of certain acts under all circumstances;
(2) Conditional and qualified prohibitions; i.e., statutory provisions
referring in general terms to the prohibition of certain acts, the
extent and details of such prohibitions to be determined by the
rules and regulations of the Commission and the Federal Reserve
Board; and,
(3) Affirmative requirements; i.e., statutory provisions requiring
the doing of certain acts.225
Citing to testimony from the Senate Hearings, Mr. Herlands asserts “[t]he
provisions may be classified functionally into four fields of regulation: (a) The
control of credit that flows into the stock market; (b) The protection of investors
from evils that are possible under existing stock market machinery; (c) The
protection of investors from ignorance and exploitation by large inside operators;
and, (d) The regulation of over-the-counter markets in unlisted securities with
resulting protection to securities listed on registered exchanges.”226 Under this
framework, although Mr. Herlands did not specify, a reasonable interpretation is
that subsections (b) and (c) would be the most likely categories for Section 20(b)
to be utilized to protect investors.
Moreover, Mr. Herlands classifies violations of Section 20(b) in the
category of violations where an absolute and unqualified prohibition exists.227 He
also characterizes Section 20(b) as the “principal-accessory rule.”228

William B. Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 No. 2 VA. L.
REV., 139, 150-51 (1934).
225

Id. at 150, n.31(citing Testimony of T. G. Corcoran, S. Hearings, 6465-66; Testimony of L. J.
Stern, S. Hearings, 6973-74; Testimony of T. G. Gay, S. Hearings, 6587).
226

227

Id. at 150.

228

Id. at 168.

2015]

CATCHING THE MAN BEHIND THE MAN: WHY THE SEC AND FINRA
SHOULD CAPITALIZE ON SECTION 20(B) TO PURSUE CONTROL PERSONS

321

B. Bernard Wexler229 –1975
While the Securities Act was wending its way through Congress, the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency was looking into malpractices in the
trading markets.230
That investigation (commonly called the “Pecora Hearings”)
uncovered a wealth of material about manipulation, insider
trading, breaches of fiduciary duty by the controlling persons of
corporations and other strategically situated people who profited
handsomely out of the financial distress of the companies that
they dominated. It showed how these persons sold the stocks of
their own companies short, concealed material information, and
engaged in other malpractices.231
Mr. Wexler also commented as follows:
Complying with that direction, the Commission made an
exhaustive study of the … investment company industry. Its
report, known as the “Investment Trust Study,” found that to an
alarming extent investment companies had been operated in the
interests of their managers and to the detriment of investors. A
high incidence of recklessness and improvidence was also noted.
Insiders often viewed investment companies as sources of capital
for business ventures of their own and as captive markets for
unsalable securities that they, the insiders, wished to convert into
cash. Controlling persons frequently took unfair advantage of the companies
in other ways, often using broad exculpatory clauses to insulate them from
liability for their wrongdoing. Outright larceny and embezzlement were
not uncommon. Managers were able to buy investment company
shares for less than net asset value, thus enriching themselves at
the shareholders’ expense.232

Bernard Wexler, Director of the Office of Opinions and Review, wrote a history of the SEC in
its first forty years, which was published in 2003; see, Karl Smeltzer, Memories From Early Days of the
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission
(2004),
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/2000/2004_0601_Smeltzer_Memories.pdf.
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Bernard Wexler, History of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 5 (Aug. 3, 1975),
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1975_0101_Wexler_History_SEC.pdf.
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Taken in context with the Pecora hearings, Mr. Wexler’s statement about
controlling persons appears to be entirely consistent with the views espoused by
Thomas G. Corcoran and Ferdinand Pecora.233
C. Unknown Author – 1978
In this article, the author argues that “controlling person liability should
be viewed as a subset of the general liability in section 20(b) for those who violate
the law through others.”234
The author states: “Under this view, the
demonstration of a control relationship would establish a prima facie violation of
section 20(b) through the use of intermediaries, and would shift the focus of
analysis to the controlling person sections, where the burden is upon the
defendant to establish the applicability of exculpatory language.”235 According to
the author, “a finding of controlling person status has a ‘dramatic’ effect upon a
defendant in a securities action because he then has the burden of establishing a
defense.”236 Thus, “courts should carefully scrutinize allegations of control and
remove the controlling person sections from the context of agency.”237 The
author adds: “By viewing controlling person liability as a subset of the general
liability of those who accomplish violations through others, courts may gain a
perspective on the provisions that will help prevent hasty findings of controlling
person status and liability.”238 Also, “[i]f … the conceptual basis for imposing
liability is to punish those who violate through others rather than to reinforce a
pre-existing duty to supervise, much confusion in the status phase of controlling
person analysis can be eliminated and better decisions produced.”239
While the author acknowledges that Section 20(b) has not been used as a
vehicle to serve the rule of respondeat superior and has apparently been ignored, the
challenge with this particular commentary is that the author mainly discusses
Section 20(a) violations because of the absence of any decisions involving Section
20(b) claims.240 Because there are differences in the provisions, this makes it
FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH: THE STORY OF OUR MODERN MONEY
CHANGERS (1939).
233

Note, Secondary Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Securities Acts: Toward an Improved Analysis,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (1978).
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difficult to lump them together in a discussion; for example, Section 20(a) makes
control persons “liable” instead of the Section 20(b) “unlawful” language and
Section 20(a) provides a good faith defense, where this is not available for Section
20(b).241
D. William J. Fitzpatrick and Ronald T. Carman – 1983
Fitzpatrick and Carman state that the majority view permits plaintiffs to
predicate liability on a respondeat superior theory in actions against broker-dealers
and accounting firms alleging violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 and that
Section 20(a) does not provide the exclusive means for holding a controlling party
liable for violations of the federal securities laws by its agents.242 In contrast, the
authors contend that the minority view holds that section 20(a) is the exclusive
source of liability.243
In discussing the issue, Fitzpatrick and Carman obtained an amicus brief
filed by the SEC and they quote from it selectively.244 In doing so, the authors
state that the SEC argued that respondeat superior liability is consistent with the
statutory good faith defense provided in Exchange Act section 20(a).245 However,
in disagreeing with the SEC’s position, they assert that Section 20(a) precludes the
application of the common law doctrine of respondeat superior.246 Fitzpatrick and
Carman also conclude that the SEC relied “on remarks in the legislative history to
241

Section 20(a) provides, as follows:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person
liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any
person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the
controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or
cause of action.

15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2011).
242William

J. Fitzpatrick and Ronald T. Carman, Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities Laws: A
Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1983) (emphasis added).
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Id. at 25, n.28. Although the authors provide a citation for the SEC’s amicus brief at n. 158, the
scope of the SEC’s purported argument is unclear and the brief is not presently available on
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Circuit is an open question.
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the effect that the control provisions were designed ‘to prevent evasion of the
provisions of the [laws] by organizing dummies who will undertake the actual
things forbidden by the section.”247 Instead, the authors adopt the following
position:
Upon closer examination it appears that these remarks were
primarily addressed to section 20(b), not 20(a). With referring to
the two sections, the report of the Committee on Interstate
Commerce stated that section 20(a) makes "a person who controls
a person . . . liable to the same extent as the person controlled
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not
induce the act in question," while section 20(b) "makes it unlawful
for any person to do, through any other person, anything that he
is forbidden to do himself." It appears then that Exchange Act
section 20(b), not 20(a), was specifically aimed at the "dummy"
situation.248
Regardless of Section 20(a)’s non-exclusivity, Robert Prentice rebutted
Fitzpatrick and Carman’s argument in 1997. Prentice argued that this thinking was
fatally flawed because all the “dummy” references in the legislative history of the
1933 Act were to section 15.249 Comparing Section 15 to Section 20(a), he asserts
that Section 20(a) was drawn nearly verbatim from Section 15 and adopted for
the same exact reasons.250 Also, Mr. Prentice’s view is that there is no section
20(b) parallel provision in section 15.251 Consequently, he contends as follows:
Section 20(b) remains a mysterious provision that, although it has
been seldom invoked, seems on its face to contradict any claim
that section 20(a) provides the only form of secondary liability.
Indeed, section 20(b) can plausibly be read to authorize
imposition of respondeat superior liability, although no court has so
held.252
Id. at 26. (quoting Fitzpatrick and Carman, Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities Laws: A
Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1983)).
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Premature Demise of Respondeat Superior Liability Under Section 10(b), 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1407
(1997).
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While Fitzpatrick/Carman may have been correct in part that Section
20(b) was aimed at dummies, as is evident from the legislative history that
contains numerous references to dummies, Prentice’s interpretation is also
important because of his approach concerning the legislative intent. In fact,
Prentice makes a compelling argument “that in drafting section 15 and section
20(a), Congress was not even thinking about the liability of employers for their
employees.”253 He explained that corporations, accounting firms, and law firms
do not “‘stand in the shadows’ manipulating their agents or act through
‘dummies.’ Furthermore, they should “answer for the torts of their agents
irrespective of the existence of section 20(a).”254 The reason for this is that “in
enacting section 20(a), Congress was trying to extend liability beyond the masterservant relationship, where respondeat superior liability already universally applied, in
order to reach additional, hidden malefactors.”255 Thus, “the controlling person
liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were aimed primarily at situations
of control over firms (and others) by behind-the-scenes actors.”256 Also,
“enactment of the controlling person provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts ‘was
motivated by a fear that traditional theories of secondary liability, such as agency,
would not prove adequate, in every case, to extend liability to those who were
'really responsible' for violations of the securities laws.’”257
While much of Prentice’s analysis focuses on Section 20(a), it is important
because he makes a strong case for the breadth in scope of control person liability
anticipated by the drafters of the ’34 Act. Notably, this view is contrary to the
opinion of the Sixth Circuit in SEC v. Coffey.258
E. William H. Kuehnle – 1989
Kuehnle examines the differences between the control relationship in the
statutory provisions and the principal-agent relationship in agency law, concluding
that they are not mutually exclusive. 259 Instead, he persuasively articulates that
Congress merely intended to provide an additional basis of secondary liability
253
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with its own limiting provisions.260 The language and legislative history of the
controlling persons provisions demonstrate that the provisions are not exclusive
and provide a helpful foundation for determining the proper application of the
controlling person provisions in general.261
In particular, referring to the House debates between Representatives Lea
and Hollister, Kuehnle posits that the debates clearly indicated that the
controlling person provisions were intended to reach beyond situations involving
agency liability.262 The focus on control and the absence of any reference to
common-law forms of secondary liability in the House report all indicate that the
control person provisions were intended to be a special form of liability with its
own limiting clause.263 “[T]he controlling person provisions originated as a device
to reach a particular problem that agency or other secondary liability concepts
might not reach.”264
As an example, Kuehnle relies on Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, which
has been held to be a basis for liability in enforcement actions.265 However, none
of the examples that he provides concern Section 20(b) violations. Nevertheless,
this may be partly attributed to the definition of control, which the drafters of the
’34 Act intentionally avoided defining because of the many forms the term could
take.266 In this aspect, Kuehnle believed that the House report’s reference to
actual control was made to expand coverage beyond legal control rather than
constrain the definition of control. Still, “ it indicate[d] an intent to require some
degree of realistic control, as would be provided by legal or actual control.”267
Additionally, he argues that the use of the term actual control should not be taken
necessarily as a limitation.268 In citing Handy & Harmon, Congress simply
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contrasted between the broader coverage of this provision and the Supreme
Court’s narrow interpretation on the Internal Revenue Code.269
On a related note, along the lines of semantics involving control, both the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 use the exact
same definition of control:
The term “control” (including the terms “controlling,” “controlled
by” and “under common control with”) means the possession,
direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of
the management and policies of a person, whether through the
ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.270
F. P. Gifford Carter – 2001
Carter observes that “Section 20(b) has very little interpretative history
that sheds light on what constitutes ‘through or by means of.’”271 While this may
be true, it does not necessarily create an impediment for FINRA or the SEC to
pursue Section 20(b) claims, as the FINRA v. Imbruce decision demonstrates.272
Additionally, Carter states that “[m]ost section 20(b) claims are brought
by the SEC itself because the courts have ruled that the SEC is unable to seek an
injunction under section 20(a).273 For support, he relies upon SEC v. Coffey.”274
However, as we will see in Section V, this is an untenable position when Coffey is
examined critically and in terms of the trend towards increased penalties for
violations of the federal securities laws.275 This is particularly evident in light of
the trend to expand penalties, which has continually persisted since the passage of
the 1990 Remedies Act, Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.
Carter also asserts that “[d]espite the paucity of reported opinions
regarding Section 20(b) liability, it is clear that at least two elements are required:
knowing use of the controlled person by the controlling person and culpable
269
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participation in the violation.”276 There is a logical problem with this assertion.
The first case that he cites arrives at the conclusion, in a footnote, that vicarious
liability for criminal acts under § 20(b) requires allegations of knowledge and
participation in a complaint.277 Moreover, the support for this, which appears at
best to be dicta, is derived from Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 553 F.Supp. 1347, 1362
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), which relied on Sec. Exch. Comm’n v.
Coffey. Since that time, Moss has only been cited twice where Section 20(b) is
mentioned. The first case states as follows: “few reported cases discuss the
applicability of Section 20(b), but it is clear that the section requires a showing
that a ‘controlling person knowingly used the controlled person to commit the
illegal act.’”278 For support, Cohen relies on Moss and Coffey.279 However, because
the reasoning of Coffey is unsupported, flawed, and likely to be overruled in the
future, this is a weak position, and Rush does not provide meaningful support for
Carter’s argument.
Regardless, Mr. Carter concludes that “[i]n practice … Section 20(b)
requires control, culpable participation, and a violation of the securities laws.”280
Consequently, he believes that “any exposure under section 20(b) would also
generate exposure under Section 20(a).”281 This reasoning is defective, however,
because there are multiple differences between Section 20(a) and Section 20(b).282
In spite of this, Carter assumes that “The only functional difference between the
provisions is that the SEC can only use Section 20(b) when seeking injunctive
relief.”283 This interpretation is erroneous and runs contrary to the majority of the
reasoned logic applied by numerous commentators considering Section 20(b).
G. Andrew Gillman – 2012
Gilman suggests that one problem is that while Section 20(b) of the
Exchange Act may provide a means to address the loopholes that Janus Group v.
First Derivative Trader284 created, the Supreme Court does not provide guidance on
276
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how to interpret the provision.285 In this regard, Gilman is correct and the
Supreme Court will be left to address this open question in another case in the
future. Nevertheless, Gillman asserts that Janus may be interpreted so that the
investment advisor would avoid liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 since it did
not have “ultimate authority” over the statement, and the directors would skirt
liability because they did not “make” the statement.286 However, if the investment
advisor makes the false statements “through” the innocent corporation, Section
20(b) would provide for liability against the investment advisor and fill the
“loophole” that the Janus decision creates.287 This kind of thinking is entirely
consistent with the history and scope of Section 20(b). As such, Gilman contends
that applied to Janus, JCF may be viewed as the “dummy” corporation, while JCM
provided all of the investment services necessary to operate the Funds.288
Additionally, plaintiffs would still have to prove that JCM “controlled” JCF
rather than acted “by means of” the fund.289
Gillman’s article, which presents a thoughtful analysis of Janus,
interestingly enough does not assert that plaintiffs would have to show “knowing
use” that JCM controlled JCF.
H. Arnold S. Jacobs – 2014
Jacobs wrote about the divide in Janus between Justices Thomas and
Breyer.
First, he characterizes it as the majority believing Section 20(b) is
limited to the use of innocent intermediaries, while the dissent views the Section
20(b) case law as undeveloped and believes Section 20(b) gives rise to a private
right of action.291 Second, in terms of the elements of a Section 20(b) claim,
Section 20(b) is very much like the “directly or indirectly” Rule 10b-5 wording292
290
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because both address the liability of the source of a false statement when third
parties disseminate that statement.293 Jacobs observes that there are three
differences:
[(1)] Rule 10b-5 imposes no requirement that the intermediary be
innocent, as Justice Thomas read into Section 20(b). Thus, Rule
10b-5 but not Section 20(b) covers two guilty persons acting in
concert, one who creates the misleading statement and the other
who acts as the intermediary and conveys it to the public. The
source could be liable under Rule 10b-5 as we discussed for
setting the lie in motion if the lie is attributed to him, and the
person passing it on (the intermediary) could be held responsible
because he “makes” the statement a second time when passing it
on. Thus, there are two ultimate authorities, the person who was
the ultimate authority at the source who decided to launch the
misrepresentation and the person who was the ultimate authority
at the intermediary who decided to pass on the misleading
statement. When the source or intermediary is an entity, the entity
or entities could be liable as well;
[(2)] Rule 10b-5 requires that the false statement be attributed to
the source for the source to be liable. Section 20(b) contains no
such requirement. Thus, when a source starts a false rumor in an
attempt to manipulate a stock's price upward, the source can be
held liable for the consequences of persons repeating the rumor
under Section 20(b) whether or not the rumor is attributed to the
source, but 10b-5 liability will be visited on the source only if the
source is mentioned when the rumor is repeated; and,
(3) Rule 10b-5 may require more than attribution; it might require
the plaintiff to prove something like the source intended the
statement to be disseminated further, foresaw that the statement
would be communicated to others, or did not restrict the use of
the information to the original recipient. Courts may or may not
read into Section 20(b) a similar requirement.294
Third, the majority declined to address the whether Section 20(b) created
a private right of action, but the dissent clearly viewed that it does or it would not
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have suggested a remand so that the plaintiff could add a Section 20(b) cause of
action to its complaint.295
In evaluating this distinction, because joint and several liability referenced
in Section 20(a) can arise in both private civil litigation and in SEC enforcement
actions, Jacobs suggests that courts should reach the same conclusion regarding
Section 20(b).296 “In addition, the Section 20(b) words ‘It shall be unlawful’ also
are the first words in Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to a private right of action. . . .
Even when no private right of action exists, Section 20(b) is an available remedy
for SEC and criminal actions.”297 In light of this, Jacobs presents a strong
argument that Section 20(b) claims are available in government enforcement
actions by the SEC and for private individuals.
V. EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF J ANUS AND THE FUTURE OF SECTION
20(b) CLAIMS
Since Janus, there have been eight reported decisions referring to Section
20(b). However, none of the cases resolve the open questions that exist:
•
•
•
•
•

What does the legislative history reveal about the intent of the drafters of
Section 20(b)?
Why should the Sixth Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Coffey be overruled
entirely?
Are Section 20(b) claims viable in light of the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders?
What elements are necessary to prove Section 20(b) claims?
What kinds of Section 20(b) claims can we expect to see from FINRA
and the SEC?
A. The Scope and Intent of the Legislative History of Section 20(b)

In considering the legislative history, the purpose of Section 20(b) was to
prevent evasion of the provisions of the ’34 Act by hiding behind “dummies” and
“dummy corporations” that would actually do the things forbidden by the law.298
As an example, Mr. Corcoran described a bank or a broker controlling a separate
entity dealing in securities that would commit violations of the federal securities
295
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laws.299 The drafters made it explicitly clear that they did not want this kind of
liability to be limited or narrowed, stating that it would be “impossible” to
anticipate the many ways in which actual control may be exerted.300 Specific
examples were offered by Representative Rayburn, including stock ownership,
lease, contract and agency. Because the statute was drafted simply and brilliantly,
Section 20(b) can and should be utilized to pursue other violations where actual
or legally enforceable control are present.
Another example that was set forth by Ferdinand Pecora in his book
“Wall Street Under Oath” is also useful because it demonstrates the complexity of
situations involving dummies and control persons. Russell Brown was the
Chairman of the Board of the American Commercial Alcohol Company
(ACAC).301 ACAC was organized in Maryland and Maryland law prevented the
issuance of new stock for cash unless the shareholders were first given an
opportunity to buy.302 However, a loophole existed if newly issued stock was
exchanged for that of another corporation.303 Thus, Brown’s friends, K.B.
Phagan and C.C. Capdevielle, consented to act as dummies.304 Two corporations
were formed, Maister Laboratories Incorporated (Maister) and Noxon,
Incorporated (Noxon).305 Phagan gave a promissory note for $180,000 for
Maister and Capdevielle a promissory note for $270,000 for Noxon.306 In
exchange for the notes, Messrs. Phagan and Capdevielle received all the shares
from Maister and Noxon, which they then exchanged with ACAC for 25,000
newly issued shares of its stock.307 While this technically complied with Maryland
law, Brown’s motive was to manipulate the new shares to as high a price as
possible.308 Accordingly, other associates of Brown were involved as dummies to
Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56, and S. Res. 97 Before the S.
Banking & Currency Comm. 73d Cong. 7022 (1934).
299
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form a pool to stimulate interest in the stock and sell it to the public.309 Once the
pool was in place, vigorous activity in buying and selling of the stock
commenced.310 From May 2, 1993 to July 18, 1933, the shares went from $20 to
$89.311 In addition to the pool manager, a broker known as a “specialist”
confined to a few particular stocks, was brought in to buy and sell the stock.312
The specialist, Wright, testified as follows:
MR. PECORA: And as a rule what is the object sought to be
accomplished by those persons who organize a pool account in
order to make a market in the stock?
MR. WRIGHT: To redistribute the stock at a higher price if
possible.
MR. PECORA: That is, to raise the price level of the stock as
much as possible?
MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir.313
The result of the pool’s operation was to net $210,000 profit to the pool’s
members, including Brown, but the public was left holding the bag after the stock
price plummeted from $89 to $30 by July 22, 1933.314 The public, not realizing
that the stock was being manipulated, suffered massive losses as a result of the
manipulation, while Mr. Wright personally earned his own separate profit of
$138,000 for the month of July 1933.315
With the passage of Section 20(b), this would have provided government
agencies and private individuals the ability to obtain relief from Brown as a
controlling person for his control over the pool, the pool’s manager and the
trading specialist.
B. Why Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey Should Be Overturned Entirely
Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Coffey is an unusual decision for several reasons.
Although the opinion contains thirty-four footnotes with references, the use of
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citations is abandoned before the discussion of Section 20(b) begins. This is
noteworthy because the opinion sets forth no authority for many of the
conclusions that are drawn about Section 20(b) and its scope and applicability to
such claims. To be clear, this does not mean that the authority is disagreeable;
rather, it is non-existent. What is especially troubling about this fact is that
multiple cases have cited the decision favorably for numerous propositions
concerning Section 20(b) that are unsupported, erroneous or outdated.
The first problem with Coffey is its determination that there is a
requirement for “knowing use.” Stated differently, Coffey requires proof that the
controlling person “knowingly used” the controlled person. However, the
express language of Section 20(b) concerns unlawful acts and cannot reasonably
be interpreted to include “knowing use” as a basis for liability. Another problem
is that Coffey appears to suggest that Section 20(b) claims must have derivative
liability. Concerning both of these issues, no such requirements were ever
discussed in the legislative history of Section 20(b). In fact, even critics of Section
20(b) did not advance these arguments before the ’34 Act was passed. Also, no
cases decided prior to Coffey ever imposed this condition. Regardless, in
examining the “knowing use” requirement, a reasonable interpretation is that
Coffey seeks to impose scienter as a prerequisite for liability. While common sense
and logic mandate that a separate, underlying unlawful act, the proof of which
requires scienter, must be proved with scienter, there is no justification or support
for creating a separate and unique scienter requirement that applies to Section
20(b) claims. Moreover, such a condition is inconsistent with the goal of
addressing control person liability because there are situations where violations of
the federal securities laws occur where there is “knowing use.”
As an example, in the Imbruce case, Imbruce used Berkowitz to engage in
prohibited short selling in violation of Rule 105. If FINRA had been required to
prove that Imbruce “knowingly used” Berkowitz, it is unclear whether FINRA
would have prevailed, assuming it pursued a Section 20(b) claim. While the
hearing panel determined that Imbruce’s testimony was not credible, Imbruce
denied instructing Berkowitz to short $500,000 of ATPG’s stock to reduce the
portfolio’s net long position. Without more evidence to resolve the “he said, he
said” dispute between Imbruce and Berkowitz or evidence showing Imbruce’s
state of mind, FINRA may not have had enough evidence to pursue a Section
20(b) claim if knowing use was imposed. The problem is that this creates a
potential loophole for individuals to commit technical violations of the securities
laws and then disclaim knowledge to avoid the imposition of Section 20(b). In
light of the original purpose of Section 20(b), such a result would be contrary to
the intent of the drafters.
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The second problem with Coffey is that the Sixth Circuit concludes that
“broad liability” for violations was not the congressional intent, but it also fails to
provide any support for this position. In fact, one critic of Section 20(b) voiced
the concern that control person liability should be limited where the controlling
person “makes use of other persons” to evade the act.316 Although this group’s
opposition appeared to desire some kind of use, whether knowing or not, the
drafters expressly rejected this argument. As a result, for anyone carefully
examining this issue in the future, it will be extremely difficult to persuasively
argue that the legislative intent of the drafters was to impose any use requirement,
whether it is knowing or not.
The third issue with Coffey is the declaration that Section 20(b) cannot be
used by the SEC except to pursue an injunction. Without conceding that this
may have been an accurate statement in 1974, it is highly unlikely that this is a
correct statement of law in 2014. This is because the opinion justified this based
on 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e), which was re-designated as § 78u(d) and amended shortly
after the decision was published.317 Additionally, the laws concerning remedies
and penalties have been revised multiple times since this case was decided. In
1990, Congress passed the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock
Reform Act (the “Remedies Act”), which, among other things, gave the SEC
authority generally to seek civil money penalties in enforcement cases.318 More
recently, the amount and scope of remedies was vastly expanded by the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) in
2010. Consequently, § 78u(d)(3) provides as follows:
Whenever … any person has violated any provision of this
chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, or a cease-and-desist
order entered by the Commission pursuant to section 78u-3 of
this title, … the Commission may bring an action in a United
States district court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to
impose, upon a proper showing, a civil penalty to be paid by the
person who committed such violation.319
316
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Consequently, if the SEC can pursue a Section 20(b) claim in district
court, then it may recover civil penalties. Nevertheless, even if the SEC is forced
to pursue Section 20(b) claims in an administrative proceeding, this would not
prevent the SEC from recovering civil penalties based on the statutory tier
amounts. Thus, if the latter situation applies, then the SEC could not recover the
gross amount of pecuniary gain to the defendant in the administrative forum.
The fourth problem with Coffey is that it held that the SEC could not
pursue Section 20(a) claims and that it could only pursue Section 20(b) claims to
seek injunctive relief. Nevertheless, Dodd-Frank overruled Coffey in part by
specifically including the SEC as a “person” with standing to pursue both Section
20(a) and Section 20(b) claims.
C. The Janus Decision Opens the Door to Section 20(b) Claims
Based on the foregoing, there are multiple compelling reasons for the
Sixth Circuit and ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court, to overrule the Coffey
decision, in the event that a party attempts to rely on Coffey or its progeny to
justify the following:
•
•
•
•

Imposing a “knowing use” requirement as a pre-requisite to establishing
control person liability;
Arguing that the legislative history discourages “broad liability” for
violations;
Dismissing a case brought by the SEC based on standing; and,
Preventing the SEC from obtaining civil monetary penalties and other
appropriate fines and remedies and relief beyond an injunction.

A plain reading of Janus demonstrates the Court’s interest in Section 20(b)
claims as a means of alternate liability when others, such as Rule 10b-5, may be
unavailable. In fact, one commentator, Gillman, artfully revisited Janus, viewing
the framework with JCM as the investment adviser who “made” the statement –
(as a controlling person) – and JCF acted as the dummy with “ultimate control” –
(as the controlled person). However, Section 20(b) may also be greatly expanded
in the future, as previously envisioned by the SEC in a multitude of situations, as
seen in the next section.
D. What Kinds of Claims May the SEC Bring to Enforce Section 20(b)?
Oddly, if not remarkably, neither the SEC, nor FINRA nor any private
individuals have pursued a Section 20(b) claim by itself, as a form of primary
liability. One may infer that the SEC has historically chosen other means to
pursue violators of the federal securities laws because of the “dearth” of reliable
case law. Without precedent, this understandably creates a serious litigation risk
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that a case could be defeated on a technicality if the opposing party successfully
argues that Section 20(b) only provides derivative liability.
However, in considering the language of the legislative history, Section
20(b) should be utilized to pursue violators who use dummies, dummy
corporations or hide behind others to evade liability. If the main purpose is to
“catch the man who stands behind the scenes and controls the man who is in a
nominal position of authority” then Section 20(b) provides a means of primary
liability.320 One can imagine that this would be a desirable option for FINRA or
the SEC in many different ways. As an example, if the “controlled person” is
unavailable or untouchable because of jurisdictional constraints, then Section
20(b) would at least provide an opportunity to pursue the control person.
Alternatively, if an investigation reveals that the controlled person will be a
cooperative witness who agrees to testify against a controlling person, this may
also merit the use of a Section 20(b) claim. On the other hand, if a government
agency that decided that it wanted to target both the controlling person and the
controlled person under joint liability, it could pursue a Section 20(a) claim.
Nevertheless, one potential roadblock in charging a Section 20(b) claim is
the Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Stringer321decision. As reviewed in Section III. B. IV,
while Stringer acknowledged that Section 20(b) entitles claims based on unlawful
activity through or by means of other persons, it also stated, without support, that
“[b]oth Sections 20(a) and 20(b) create secondary liability.”322 Lumping Sections
20(a) and Section 20(b) together, the court concluded, a second time that, “[b]oth
sections impose secondary liability on persons who act by and through others.”323
The problem is that these comments, which are arguably dicta, and if so, should
be ignored as they do not have precedential value, do not cite to the legislative
history or any cases whatsoever for support. Consequently, it remains to be seen
at a future date how Section 20(b) claims will be characterized. Ideally, the
Supreme Court will do the necessary legwork and research to reach the most
reasonable conclusion that Section 20(b) claims may be pursued as a primary
means of liability.
Furthermore, in order to analyze a Section 20(b) claim according to its
respective elements for proof, one can envision that the federal courts will
320
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eventually construct a three-part test, as follows, to require proof of a Section
20(b) claim:
•
•
•

A controlling person or persons, whether acting as a dummy, dummy
corporation, agent or real party in interest;
Who exercise(s) some form of actual or legally enforceable control over
another who is a controlled person; and,
The commission of an unlawful act that violates the federal securities
laws.

Alternatively, to establish control, which will be fact intensive, one may
set forth proof that there was some form of “realistic control” proposed by
Kuehnle that is also consistent with 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b–2. In terms of the
contours of when the control may end, the legislative history makes it clear that a
company that cedes control of a separate entity will not be subject to control
person liability for violations that occur after the control ends.324
Looking ahead, while there are many claims that could fall under the
broad power envisioned by Section 20(b), which has been given new life by the
expansion of penalties under the 1990 Remedies Act and other legislation enacted
during the past twenty years, as well as the Janus decision, the SEC has already
quietly contemplated Section 20(b) claims for other additional violations
throughout the past fourteen (14) years, as we will see in the next sub-sections.
1. Using Derivatives to Evade Rule 105
As part of a proposed rule concerning short selling, the SEC makes it
explicitly clear that using derivatives as a part of trading strategies designed to
evade the application of Rule 105 does not comply with Commission rules.325 As
an example, the Commission notes that some persons may attempt to skirt Rule
105 by “claiming to have a position in a security by virtue of having entered into a
‘married put’ transaction when in fact their transactions were the equivalent of
short sales, for which they used shares acquired in the offering to close-out their
restricted period sales.”326 Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits this type
of conduct. The Commission has also noted that:
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purchases effected by prearrangement or other understanding
through other purchasers in the primary offering are proscribed
through the operation of Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act,
which prohibits a person from doing indirectly any act that he is
prohibited from doing directly by the Exchange Act or any rule
thereunder.327
During the rule comment period, the New York Stock Exchange wrote to
advocate its support for the rule:
Given the proliferation of this intentional manipulation of the
market, the NYSE supports efforts by the industry to address the
use of derivatives to disguise illegal covering activity. The focus
of these efforts should be to expose activities that intentionally
circumvent the prohibitions of Rule 105 or otherwise manipulate
the market around an offering of securities. These efforts should,
at a minimum, evaluate trading strategies using a sampling of
different types of derivatives and assess the consequences of such
conduct on the market, issuers and investors. Results from an
industry effort to expose these strategies will allow the
Commission and the securities industry, at large, to determine
whether future rulemaking is necessary with respect to derivatives
in this area.328
Similar to the Imbruce decision, it is easy to envision that there will be
future violations where options are used by controlling persons to engage in
violations of Rule 105 that trigger Section 20(b) liability.
2. Potential Violations of Regulation Fair Disclosure Triggering Section
20(b) Claims
Under Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act, a senior manager who directs
another person to make the disclosure may be held liable for a claim under
Section 20(b) and Regulation Fair Disclosure (which is treated as 13(a) claim).
Under the Final Rule on selective disclosure and insider trading, the SEC
established that “neither an issuer nor such a covered person could avoid the
reach of the regulation merely by having a non-covered person make a selective
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disclosure.”329 Therefore, Section 20(b) prohibits a senior official from escaping
liability “by directing non-covered personnel to make a selective disclosure of
information to someone within the classes of enumerated recipients. In such a
case, the senior officer would be held responsible for making the selective
disclosure.”330 In essence, the senior manager would be viewed as the controlling
person and the “other” employee as the one who is controlled. Finally, the
definition of a “person acting on behalf of the issuer” specifically excludes an
“officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer who discloses material
nonpublic information in breach of a duty of trust or confidence to an issuer.”331
Accordingly, “[i]n this situation, the issuer would not be held responsible under
Regulation FD for its employee's actions.”332
3. Falsification of Accounting Records May Trigger Section 20(b) Violations
Pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1, which concerns the falsification of
accounting records: “No person shall directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be
falsified, any book, record or account subject to section 13(b)(2)(A) of the
Securities Exchange Act.” By including the term “indirectly” the statute, as
codified, includes a reference to multiple other provisions of the federal securities
laws, including Section 20(b).333 As a result, this provides another means to
establish liability for Section 20(b) claims.
4. Regulation AC May Present Opportunities for Section 20(b) Claims
In 2003, the SEC issued the final rule on Regulation AC, which requires:
that brokers, dealers, and certain persons associated with a broker
or dealer include in research reports certifications by the research
analyst that the views expressed in the report accurately reflect his
or her personal views, and disclose whether or not the analyst
received compensation or other payments in connection with his
or her specific recommendations or views.334
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In a footnote in the release, it explains that “Regulation AC is directed at
those regulated persons that prepare research reports, as well as persons
associated with regulated persons who might be used if attempts were made to
improperly circumvent the rule.”335 Also, this statement refers to Section 20(b) in
anticipation of such claims based on Regulation AC violations.
CONCLUSION
Similar to many of the other provisions of the ’34 Act, Section 20(b) was
created to address unlawful activity affecting the markets. It provides a specific
means for government agencies to “catch the man behind the man” to prevent
violators from evading liability. Also, the legislative history supports a broad,
rather than narrow, purpose behind the law as a means of primary liability. This
article is intended to frame the discussion so that the federal courts will treat
Section 20(b) claims distinctly from Section 20(a) claims and to properly evaluate
Section 20(b) claims on their own right and in their own context. With
restrictions on insider trading as a result of the Janus decision, government
agencies should consider utilizing and implementing Section 20(b) to obtain relief.
If doing so ultimately protects investors, then this also supports one aspect of the
SEC’s tri-partite mission. By extension, if prevailing on such claims results in
relief for the government and possibly the investing public, this should also deter
future violations of the federal securities laws.
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